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CAN SELF-DEFENSE SERVE AS AN APPROPRIATE
TOOL AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM?
Jan Kittrich*

I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of terrorism represents one of the gravest challenges to
international order, peace, and security. The unpredictable nature of terrorist attacks
threatens the public safety of each member of the international community. At the
same time, member states’ responses to terrorism appear to threaten the homogeneity
of modern international law and disrupt the uniform system of legal rules. In some
aspects, it also seems to divide the community of international scholars. Simply put,
terrorism deviates from the rule of law and so might the responsive action that it
necessitates. This is the potential danger that terrorism intentionally aims to escalate.1
Modern terrorism poses serious and unprecedented challenges to public
international law. In particular, it is very difficult to find and identify terrorist groups
or infrastructure; international law does not always serve as an efficient deterrent for
terrorists, as it is inconsistent and not easily enforceable; the effectiveness of
international law is very often limited by the cross-border nature of terrorist networks;
terrorists are often located outside the target states and thus the defensive measures
mean challenging third, “neutral” states’ sovereignty.
But in this sense, it must be admitted that sovereignty cannot be separated from
the responsibilities that are linked intrinsically to sovereignty. One of the most
essential responsibilities is to prevent its own sovereign territory from being used by
non-state entities instigating terrorist or armed attacks against other states.2 Case law
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) supports the existence of the aforementioned

* Associate Lecturer of International Law, Department of Politics, University of Hradec Kralove,
Czech Republic. J.D., Charles University, Prague; Dr. iur., Universität Mannheim; M.C.L., Universität
Mannheim/University of Adelaide. The author would like to thank Amy Clearwater for valuable assistance
in editing the Article.
1. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:
BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 155 (1993).
2. This obligation is explicitly stipulated in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 2625), which reads as follows:
Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities
within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to
in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 125, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970). This duty has been reiterated in
subsequent international documents such as United Nations General Assembly Declaration to Supplement
the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (Dec. 17, 1996), which specifies
that “states guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations . . . must refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting of participating in terrorist acts in territories of another states, or from
acquiescing in or encouraging activities within its their territories directed towards the commission of such
acts.” G.A. Res. 49/60, ¶ II 5(a), U.N. Doc. A/Res./4960 (Dec. 9, 1994).
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duty. In its Corfu Channel opinion of 1949, the court stated that every state is under
an obligation “not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts in a manner
contrary to the rights of other states.”3 Allowing its territory to be used by terrorist
groups committing attacks against another state will, beyond any doubt, breach the
obligation stated above. Thus, the Corfu Channel concept could be applied to terrorist
activities.
States that allow this situation risk bearing the negative consequences of
neglecting their communal duty. Sovereignty should not serve as protection from a
state’s responsibility when that state knowingly offers its territory for launching
terrorist attacks.
Very specific situations arise when the local state (whose territory is used by
terrorists) is unwilling or unable to put an end to activities of terrorist or armed groups.
Could the local state, under international law, become a target of forcible measures by
the threatened or attacked state? Could a terrorist attack emanating from its territory
be attributed to the local state due to the fact it has neglected its aforementioned duty?
These are very serious questions that deserve detailed analysis.
As international law should not be a “suicide pact,”4 it should allow states to
defend their legitimate interests and avert danger by force if there is no other
alternative. No one can expect that the inability or unwillingness of a state to meet its
international legal obligations could impair the essential interest of the threatened state
and deprive it of the right to respond by forcible measures. These exceptional
measures should be of very limited purpose and scope. One should not forget that the
celebrated Caroline opinion of 1837 involved the use of force against armed bands;
it was a clear example of forcible incursion into the territory of another state for a
limited purpose.5 It could be inferred from the case that the two states agreed, that in
certain limited circumstances, a state might use forcible measures against a non-state
entity in cases of “strong overpowering necessity” to prevent the illegal activities of
armed bands.6

3. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
4. Louis René Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1,
31 (1994).
5. In the Caroline case, British soldiers undertook an incursion into the territory of the United States
and seized the Caroline steamer used by the rebels against British rule. The Avalon Project at Yale Law
School, Webster Ashburn Treaty—The Caroline Case (1997), http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
diplomacy/britain/br-1842d.htm [hereinafter The Caroline Case]. The boat was ultimately damaged and
sent over Niagara Falls. Id. The British government stated in subsequent diplomatic correspondence that
the United States did not effectively stop the operation of the rebel groups and left their action
unchallenged. Id. Foreign Secretary Ashburton explicitly remarked:
But however strong this duty may be, it is admitted by all writers, by all Jurists, by the
occasional practice of all nations, not excepting your own, that a strong overpowering
necessity may arise, when this great principle may and must be suspended. It must be so for
the shortest possible period, during the continuance of an admitted overruling necessity, and
strictly confined within the narrowest limits imposed by that necessity . . . . How long could
a Government, having the paramount duty of protecting its own people, be reasonably
expected to wait for what they had then no reason to expect?
Id.
6. Id.
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When facing the threat of international terrorism, the right of self-defense might
seem an appropriate tool against terrorist attacks. In order to make the protection of
the rights of member states and the law enforcement process more efficient, the right
of self-defense is of great importance and represents the only justifiable resort to
unilateral force.7 The question may be posed: Should self-defense be regarded as a
lawful tool when suppressing attacks conducted by highly-organized terrorist groups?
Answering this question is difficult as many aspects of the right of self-defense must
be assessed and evaluated (e.g., if the right of self-defense is broad enough to include
armed strikes against terrorists on the territory of another state; or if the customary
conditions of self-defense may be redefined when facing terrorist threats). All these
aspects shall be analyzed below.
Because the right of self-defense is linked intrinsically to the concept of state
sovereignty, it is left to the discretion of that state to determine whether it will take any
defensive measures. Therefore, the state becomes the sole judge of the cause that gives
rise to its claimed self-defense. It must be noted at the beginning that action taken in
self-defense should not be aimed at punishing the offender or preventing future
violation. Self-defense should never be retributive in nature. In broader terms, the
purpose of defensive force is the protection and conservation of values that appear
essential to the defending state. As Professor Schwarzenberger put it, the purpose of
self-defense is to repel “any present invasion of the rights of the defender.”8
Undoubtedly, acts of international terrorism disrupt the values that are essential for the
state; therefore, using military force in self-defense may seem justified.
There is another issue of utmost importance that must be highlighted: whether,
under the law of state responsibility, an armed attack conducted by a terrorist group
can be attributed to the local state. This issue is very serious as such a state could
become a target of forcible measures of the attacked state. Article 8 of the
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (the Articles)
provides: “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of
a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the
conduct.”9
II. PRINCIPLES OF ATTRIBUTION AND DEGREES OF COMPLICITY
There are several possible scenarios involving complicity between the local state
and the terrorist group for which we need to assess the legal consequences. The major
aspect is the degree of complicity of the host state, which will ultimately decide what

7. This was confirmed in the Judgment of the Military Tribunal for Far East (Tokyo), where it was
declared “any law, international or municipal, which prohibits recourse to force, is necessarily limited by
the right of self-defense.” TOKYO JUDGMENT, INT’L MIL. TRIB. FOR FAR E. 47 (1977). Additionally, it is
apparent that all major legal systems recognize the excuse of self-defense. See Matt S. Nydell, Tensions
between International Law and Strategic Security: Implications of Israel’s Preemptive Raid on Iraq’s
Nuclear Reactor, 24 VA. J. INT’L L. 459, 465 (1984).
8. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 ACAD. DROIT INT’L
RECUEIL COURS 195, 335 (1955).
9. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28. 2002). See also Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, Symposium: The ILC’s State
Responsibility Articles, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 773, 783 n.67 (2002).
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legal options exist for the attacked or threatened state. Some remarks will also be
made on the relevance of the law of state responsibility, in particular, on the issue of
whether such acts can be attributed to the state. There is an overarching principle that
needs to be highlighted at the beginning. It is submitted that Article 51 permits a state
to react to an armed attack committed by non-state entity.10 As the defensive measure
will inevitably affect another sovereign state, another issue must be assessed. Scholars
are divided as to whether state involvement is necessary in these cases in order to
activate the right of self-defense. Some scholars uphold the restrictive view:
demanding the existence of a certain involvement or specific link (based on rules on
state responsibility) between the perpetrators of the armed attack and the host state.
However, other scholars argue that due to the increased threat of transnational
terrorism, this high threshold should be relaxed. Consequently, the principle of
“substantial involvement,” which has often been regarded as a condition sine qua non,
should be lowered. There are several prominent scholars who take a rather extreme
view, claiming that an armed attack conducted by non-state actors automatically
triggers the right of self-defense irrespective of any state involvement.11
A. De Jure Organs of a State
Firstly, acts of de jure organs of a state that act in the state’s name or on its behalf
are fully attributable to such a state.12 There is no question that an armed attack
committed by these organs would be directly attributable to the state itself. In fact, it
would be the state itself launching the armed attack. Such a scenario can be described
as the so-called “state terrorism” or “state-sponsored terrorism.” Article 4(2) of the
Articles requires that private actors would have to be accorded a “status in accordance
with the internal law of the state.”13 It is submitted that in contemporary interstate
relations, this scenario is the least probable.
B. De Facto Organs of a State
The local state is also responsible for the acts of the so-called de facto organs of
its own. These are usually acts of individuals—mostly physical persons—who do not
normally possess any state authority; however, in some specific situations, they might
be acting under direction or in the interest of the state concerned. They might be
ancillaries of the state or volunteer personnel for specific purposes. When discussing
de facto organs the specific factual relationship between them and the state concerned
is crucial. The nature or genuineness of the factual relationship ultimately will be a
decisive factor in assessing whether acts of the organs can be attributed to the state.

10. Article 51 provides: “Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into
account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.” G.A. Res. 56/83, ¶ 51,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28. 2002).
11. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 98 AM. J. INT’L L., 839, 840
(2001); see also Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO J. INT’L L. 7, 17 (2003).
12. De jure organs of a state might be understood as legislative, judicial, executive, or administrative
bodies or state agencies, irrespective of their internal hierarchy. The state will thus be responsible for the
acts of its local, municipal, and federal organs.
13. G.A. Res. 56/83, ¶ 4(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28. 2002).
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A state will likely be held responsible in cases where the de facto organs contravene
the directions of the state. Also, the factual relationship will likely be established in
cases where the local states tolerate acts of individuals that cause damage or other
injuries to neighboring third states of without any intention to stop such activities
though having sufficient resources and capacity to do so.
As the ICJ ruled in Nicaragua, relying on Article 3(g) of the Definition of
Aggression, an armed attack may also encompass “‘sending by or on behalf of a State of
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts against another state
of such gravity as to amount to’ an actual armed attack conducted by regular
forces . . . .”14 The ICJ set up a relatively high standard for state involvement because the
mere assistance or provision of weapons or support of terrorists shall not elevate to the
level of an armed attack.15 The court confirmed that a non-state attack may, under certain
conditions, trigger the right of self-defense, provided it is of sufficient gravity and the
state concerned is significantly involved.16 This being said, the court narrowed the scope
of self-defense to only such armed attacks as can be attributed to a particular state.17
However, an important principle must be highlighted: the mere support of terrorist
groups—be it weapons or logistical—may not be regarded as an armed attack “as long
as the private group has not yet committed acts of military force against another state.”18
As already mentioned, the court’s decision raised a lot of criticism in relation to such
narrow construction of the term “armed attack.” It remained unclear what degree of
control a state must exercise over terrorists in order to be held responsible for the
terrorists’ actions. One might argue that a similar approach may be applied to cases of
terrorist attacks, as they may be equivalent to armed attacks. The Nicaragua decision
suggests that a state must exercise very significant or substantial influence over the
terrorists before the armed attack may be imputed to the state. As the court concluded,
“effective control” of a state over the groups or other non-state entities must exist.19 This
conclusion indicates that certain terrorist groups, not being state organs but receiving
support and direction from the state, may become de facto agents of such state. It must
be admitted that it may not be easy for the victim state to provide sufficient evidence to
prove the test of “effective control.”
In 1999, the Appeal Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (ICTY) decided Prosecutor v. Tadi…,20 wherein the
court adopted a more liberal view regarding terrorists acting as de facto organs of a
state. The ICTY held that the necessary degree of control or involvement would

14. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27) [hereinafter
Nicaragua] (quoting G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 143, U.N. Doc. A/2319 (Dec. 14, 1974)). At the same
time, the court ruled that “financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the
selection of its military or paramilitary targets” was insufficient to for the purposes of attributing an armed
attack. Id. at 64.
15. Id. at 104.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER, On Article 51, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, 788, 801 (Bruno Simma ed., Oxford 2002).
19. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J at 65. The court ruled that “it would in principle have to be proved that the
State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged
violations were committed.” Id.
20. Prosecutor v. Tadi…, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Jul. 15, 1999).
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depend on the factual circumstances of each case and declined to see “why in each and
every circumstance international law should require a high threshold for the test
control.”21 In its judgment of July 15, 1999, the ICTY affirmed that:
[i]n order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a state, it must be
proved that the state wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and
financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its
military activity. Only then can the state be held internationally accountable for any
misconduct of the group. However, it is not necessary that, in addition, the state
should also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, instructions for the
commission of specific acts contrary to international law.22

The ICTY’s ruling could indicate that there has been a certain shift in assessing the
state’s involvement in terrorist activities. Terrorist organisations can possess a
considerable amount of autonomy and still be regarded as de facto organs of a state.23
It can be seen from the Tadi… case that the main difference from the principle set by the
Nicaragua case seems to rest in the degree of control exercised by the local state.
Nonetheless, even the ICTY stated that the degree of control should exceed “the mere
financing and equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the planning
and supervision of military operations.”24
Recent history shows that there are instances when a state’s involvement in terrorist
activity amounts to an armed attack. As the de facto organs of a state, we might also
include the acts and activities of the Al-Qaeda terrorist group in Afghanistan due in
particular to the factual relationship between the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda.25 As a
consequence, the Taliban (i.e., the Afghan state) should bear erga omnes responsibility
for the breach of imperative rule of public international law. The Taliban regime has
been repeatedly urged by the international community (including the UN Security
Council26) to prevent Al-Qaeda from using the territory of Afghanistan as a base for

21. Id. at ¶ 117.
22. Id. at ¶ 131. The case itself did not involve armed attack per se, but the ICTY was assessing
whether the acts of Bosnian Serb armed forces could be attributed to the Yugoslav government. See id. at
¶¶ 121, 145.
23. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 182-83 (1988).
24. Tadi…, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment at ¶ 145.
25. Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility stipulates
who might be an accomplice in an internationally wrongful act. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 149 (2002). The responsibility, according to the
article, arises if the aid or assistance was provided with the “knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act,” and the act by the state receiving such aid and assistance was internationally
wrongful. Id.
26. The Security Council adopted numerous resolutions reaffirming deep disturbance of the council
by “the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and
training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts.” S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (Dec. 8,
1998). As the Taliban did not act in conformity with the previous resolutions, the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, insisted that:
the Afghan faction known as the Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, comply promptly with its previous resolutions and in particular cease the provision
of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations, take appropriate
effective measures to ensure that the territory under its control is not used for terrorist
installations and camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts against other
states or their citizens, and cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice.
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training and to surrender Osama bin Laden. Based on the information available, it is
undisputed that the Taliban did not comply with the U.N. Security Council resolutions
demanding immediate surrender of bin Laden. The Taliban regime also declined to
condemn the terrorist attacks committed by Al-Qaeda. Thus it may be suggested that the
relationship between the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda was mutually beneficial.27
The same structure might be applicable to the suicidal acts of Palestinian terrorists
(Hamas, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades), which, in the opinion of the author, are not acts
of private persons but acts of de facto organs of the Palestinian National Authority,
executing control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
If the relationship between the terrorist group and the host state equates to
cooperation, whereby the state provides significant support to the group, then such
cooperation can be understood as complicity of the host state. Such a high degree of
complicity means that the respective state incurs responsibility for the acts of the nonstate actors, and thus might become a target of actions undertaken in self-defense by
another state. Of course there might be, on a case-by-case basis, different levels of
complicity that do not imply responsibility of the concerned host state. As previously
noted, international legal theory is not in concert on this issue. Whereas some scholars
see the level of cooperation very liberally (Sofaer,28 Byers,29 and Randelzhofer30), some
put the complicity threshold relatively high (Paust,31 Cassese,32 Frowein,33 and

....
. . . [T]he Taliban [must] turn over [O]sama bin Laden without further delay to
appropriate authorities in a country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate authorities
in a country where he will be returned to such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a
country where he will be arrested and effectively brought to justice.
S.C. Res. 1267, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (later reconfirming the obligation).
27. This conclusion was reiterated by the British government as it officially declared that these two
entities have a:
close and mutually dependent alliance. Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaida provide the Taliban
regime with material, financial and military support. They jointly exploit the drugs trade.
The Taliban regime allows Bin Laden to operate his terrorist training camps and activities
from Afghanistan, protects him from attacks from outside, and protects the drugs stockpiles.
Osama Bin Laden could not operate his terrorist activities without the alliance and support
of the Taliban regime. The Taliban’s strength would be seriously weakened without Osama
Bin Laden’s military and financial support.
OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE U.K., RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TERRORIST ATROCITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 11 SEPTEMBER 2001, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/11/ukreport.html.
28. Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 26 MIL. L. REV., 89 (1989).
29. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 67
(2005).
30. See RANDELZHOFER, supra note 18, at 801.
31. As Professor Jordan Paust commented, “Far different is mere ‘state responsibility’ for harbouring
or aiding terrorist armed attacks as opposed to direct participation in the non-state attack by a state. Mere
‘state responsibility’ can subject the state to political, diplomatic, economic, or juridic sanctions, but not
lethal military force in self-defense.” Jordan Paust, Detention and Due Process in International Law, in
TERRORISM AND THE MILITARY: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 39-41 (Wybo P. Heere ed., 2003).
32. Antonio Cassese, The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism, 38 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 589 (1989).
33. See Jochen A. Frowein, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-Speaking
Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
55, 64 (Hague Academy of International Law, 1988).
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Boyle34). For example, Professor Abraham Sofaer advocated a very low complicity
threshold, stating:
[I]f no evidence is developed that a state is directly responsible for specific acts, the
state’s general and continuing support for a group known to be engaged in terrorism
should suffice to establish responsibility for aiding or conspiring, if not as a principal
for the crime itself. Differences in the degree of proof of actual approval by a state of
specific terrorist acts should operate the to vary the degree of responsibility and the
remedies imposed, rather than to permit a state to exploit the high standard of proof
that should govern in determining the propriety of resorting to self-defense.35

It is doubtful that this low threshold can be accepted as being appropriate in international law. It deviates significantly from the doctrine of state responsibility and
would cause the “innocent” state, which may have a “terrorist” record from the past,
to become a target of another state’s self-defense measures. If there is no complicity
on the side of a state, an attacked state may not deploy force in self-defense against the
former, unless specifically stipulated by a resolution of the Security Council. If the
attacked state retaliated against a non-complicit state, such an action would represent
a dramatic and unwarranted extension of the right of self-defense. It may not be
forgotten that the degree of complicity will definitely vary from case to case, and thus
the legitimacy of the defensive action will depend heavily on the specific
circumstances of each case. There is a significant school of thought that maintains that
a terrorist armed attack of sufficient scale and gravity automatically activates the right
of self-defense irrespective of whether it can be attributed to a territorial state or not.
These scholars, Professors Greenwood36 and Franck,37 argue that the wording of
Article 51 does not preclude such possibility. They also refer to the recent Security
Council resolutions (1368 and 1373) adopted in 2001, which reiterated the right of
self-defense following large-scale terrorist attacks.
Historically, the liberal view was very close to the American official policy in the
fight against terrorism. This fact can be clearly demonstrated by the speech of thenSecretary of State George P. Shultz who, in January 1986 (paradoxically a few weeks
before the Libyan involvement in serious terrorist attacks against Americans), stated:
There should be no confusion about the status of nations that sponsor terrorism
against Americans and American property. There is substantial legal authority for the
view that a state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against another state,
or which supports or encourages terrorist planning and other activities within its own
territory, is responsible for such attacks. Such conduct can amount to an ongoing
armed aggression against the other state under international law.38

This view has had a long tradition within U.S. administrations and certain aspects
thereof can be found in U.S. National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006.

34. See Francis A. Boyle, Remarks, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 288, 297 (1987).
35. See Sofaer, supra note 28, at 105.
36. See generally Greenwood, supra note 11, at 17.
37. See generally Franck, supra note 11, at 840.
38. George Shultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, Address before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference at the
National Defense University (Jan. 15, 1986), in 86 DEP’T ST. BULL., Feb. 1986, at 15.
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Finally, it should be mentioned that it is not always possible to discover or
investigate the degree of complicity. A state has many means by which to hide or
camouflage its complicity with terrorist organizations and is likely to deny any
allegations of aiding and harbouring terrorists. It is undeniable that many states in the
past have sponsored, aided, or provided sanctuary to terrorists without being held
internationally responsible for such conduct. Such states have found various excuses
and claimed that the activities of terrorist groups were driven by legitimate concerns.
This behavior pattern renders the establishment of a complicity link very subjective
and open to potential abuse. The proponents of the liberal approach seem to properly
assess the current situation by taking into account the increased number of cases in
which the state may be understood to be harbouring terrorists. Their aim is to adapt
the restrictive test of “substantial involvement” to be in line with current developments.
Overly-cautious reliance on rules of state responsibility does not mirror the current
situation any more. After the September 11, 2001, attacks, there seems to be more
support for the proposition that the “substantial involvement” standard should
encompass the harboring of terrorists. That scenario would cover situations in which
a state, which has become a target of an armed attack by a non-state group, may use
force in self-defense against its bases on the territory of another state, as long as the
state willingly harbors the group.39 Professor Randelzhofer contends that the
victimized state might react by military means against the terrorist group within the
territory of the other state as “otherwise, a so-called failed state would turn out to be
a safe haven for terrorists; [and this is] certainly not what Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the
[U.N.] Charter are aiming at.”40 Harboring in this respect could mean leaving its own
territory at disposal for the training and operation of the group with the knowledge or
indication that it might use force against other states.
Notably, the issue regarding a state’s encouragement of terrorism was addressed
authoritatively by the U.N. General Assembly in December 1994 when dealing with
measures to eliminate international terrorism. The Sixth Committee recommended to
the General Assembly a draft resolution with the ultimate purpose of enhancing the
struggle against international terrorism. The General Assembly adopted without a vote
the wording prepared by the Sixth Committee, stipulating the obligation of a state to:
refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating
terrorist activities and to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that their
respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for
the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed against other
states or their citizens.41

Because the international community adopted this resolution unanimously, it may be
considered a reflection of an evolving norm of customary international law.42 This

39. See BYERS, supra note 24, at 67.
40. See RANDELZHOFER, supra note 18, at 802.
41. G.A. Res. 49/60, Annex II, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Feb. 17, 1995).
42. The General Assembly addressed this issue again in 1996, strongly condemning all acts of international
terrorism and urging all member states if they had not yet done so to consider becoming parties to conventions
aimed at suppressing international terrorism. The General Assembly also adopted provisions supplementing
the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. In the supplement, the states declared
“that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles
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obligation was repeatedly reiterated in relevant Security Council resolutions
demanding the Taliban to cease providing a safe haven to the Al-Qaeda terrorist
network as well as providing training facilities. Violation of such an obligation may
cause serious consequences for the respective contravener.
C. Subsequent Adoption of the Conduct as its Own
There may exist a scenario whereby terrorists act independent of the state
concerned and therefore the acts are not attributable to that state until it adopts or
approves such acts. The Articles on State Responsibility of 2001 reflect this scenario
in Article 11, which stipulates that “conduct which is not attributable to a state under
the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that state under
international law if and to the extent that the state acknowledges and adopts the
conduct as its own.”43 The International Court of Justice in its 1980 decision titled
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,44 echoed this
doctrine. At the outset of the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, militant
student groups had not initially acted on behalf of Iran, for the Iranian authorities had
not specifically instructed them to perform those acts.45 At that moment, the attack was
not yet imputable to the Iranian government.
Nevertheless, as the court subsequently ruled, Iran was held internationally
responsible for failing to prevent the attack on the United States’ diplomatic premises
and subsequently to put an end to that attack. A few days later, the Iranian authorities
ultimately formally approved and endorsed the occupation of the embassy and the
detention of the U.S. nationals by militants. This situation dramatically changed the
legal nature of the case. In the view of the court, this was the stage when the groups
of militants became de facto agents of the Iranian state, and, as such, their acts became
legally attributable to the state.46 In the scenario above, once the acts of militant

of the United Nations.” G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Jan. 16, 1997).
43. CRAWFORD, supra note 25, at 121.
44. Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
[hereinafter Tehran].
45. Id. at 11-13. The International Court of Justice explained:
No suggestion has been made that the militants, when they executed their attack on the
Embassy, had any form of official status as recognised “agents” or organs of the Iranian
state. Their conduct in mounting the attack, overrunning the Embassy and seizing its
inmates as hostages cannot, therefore, be regarded as imputable to that state on that basis.
Their conduct might be considered as itself directly imputable to the Iranian state only if it
were established that, in fact, on the occasion in question the militants acted on behalf of
the state, having been charged by some competent organ of the Iranian state to carry out a
specific operation. The information before the Court does not, however, suffice to establish
with the requisite certainty the existence at that time of such a link between the militants and
any competent organ of the state.
Id. at 30.
46. The International Court of Justice determined:
The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian
state, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy
and detention of the hostages into acts of that state. The militants, authors of the invasion
and jailers of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian state for whose acts the
state itself was internationally responsible.
Id. at 35.
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groups or terrorists are approved by that state, the targeted state may invoke selfdefense. That is to say, in such a case, the act that triggered responsibility under the
laws of state responsibility also generated the possibility of a forcible response in selfdefense.
D. Duty of Due Diligence and the Failure to Prevent
There is the last scenario regarding the operations of terrorist groups. These
groups may use the territory of a state as a starting point for launching armed attacks
without direct or indirect involvement of the territorial state. In such situations, a
state’s complicity cannot be imputed, as the state may be incapable of stopping the
terrorist operations. The host state is merely unable or unwilling to stop the activities
emanating from its territory. In principle, the state is not responsible for acts of private
persons. Nevertheless, this should not mean that the third state would have to sustain
illegal acts emanating from these individuals because there is no sovereign state
responsible for their behavior. Such an approach would not promote fairness and
justice in international relations. There is, however, a well-established duty under
general international law requiring a state to exercise due diligence, which means
preserving a certain standard of public order: a state is obliged to take all reasonable
measures in order to prevent harm and illegal acts to be caused to third states. This
obligation has been reiterated authoritatively in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly
Relations:
Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.47

As the provisions stipulated in the declaration are restatements of customary
international law, they are binding on all states of the international community. Case
law also supports the doctrine of due diligence. As early as 1946, the International
Court of Justice held in Corfu Channel that “general and well-recognized principles”
included “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for
acts contrary to the rights of other States.”48 If the Corfu Channel principle is applied
to modern terrorist activities, then a state possesses an obligation not to permit its
territory to be used as a base for acts of terrorism.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the local or host state is in breach of
international law towards this third state—a breach of due diligence, an internationally
wrongful act—and thus can be held responsible for such a breach. This breach,
however, does not logically qualify as an armed attack. A state victimized by terrorist

47. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N.
Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
48. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22. Corfu Channel involved a situation in which British warships
struck mines and were heavily damaged. Id. at 27. The International Court of Justice held that there was
not enough evidence to prove that the minefield was laid with the connivance of the Albanian government.
Id. at 16.
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activities has the right to defend its territorial integrity against such activities. The host
state could be subject to proportional countermeasures by the attacked state.
As stated above, the mere inactivity of the local state may not imply its complicity
or responsibility. Controversial questions arise if the attacks conducted from the
territory of such an unwilling state are of significant scale and effect. In this respect,
the threatened state cannot be left without remedy. Correspondingly, the terrorists may
not be allowed to use such a state as a shield for their attacks. As the attack is not
attributable to the host state in accordance with respective rules on responsibility of
state, there must be other options to avert the danger emanating from the territory.
Scholars are not in concert in terms of what measures might be taken by the victimized
state. Some scholars accord the state the right of self-defense in such situations. One
scholar, Professor Ruth Wedgwood, stated that “if a host country permits use of its
territory as a staging area for terrorist attacks . . . the host government cannot expect
to insulate its territory against measures of self-defense.”49 Recently, there have been
several examples in which states invoked the right of self-defense as a response to
armed attacks from a state whose government was unable to exercise full jurisdictional
power over its territory—i.e., from the so-called “failed” states.50 However, state
practice seems inconclusive in proving that there would be a general opinio juris
confirming the possibility of self-defense invocation against failed states.
There may exist a situation in which the territorial state has taken all measures to
preclude the activities but groups of private persons still succeed in attacking another
(third) state. Therefore, the territorial state should not be held responsible, as it has
taken all the precautionary measures. However, the territorial state should cooperate
with the attacked or victimized state in order to remove the terrorists from its territory.
It is undisputed that private armed groups and terrorists may not profit from the
inability or passivity of the territorial state.
Professor Dinstein also addressed this issue, calling for an extraordinary solution.51
As he stated, self-defense allows a state to react only against an armed attack.52 The
only solution, as Article 51 is not applicable in this scenario, is the so-called
“extraterritorial law enforcement,” whose sole purpose is to destroy the bases of hostile
armed bands. Taking these measures, the victimized state only substitutes for the local
state in fulfilling the duty of due diligence.53
Dinstein’s thinking seems to be influenced by the conclusions of the 1980 Report
of the International Law Commission, which stated—paraphrasing Roberto Ago’s
words—that the threatened state could invoke the “state of necessity” and undertake
forcible measures against the host state with the sole aim to destroy or paralyse the

49. Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT’L L.
559, 565 (1999).
50. For example, incursions of the Turkish army into the territory of Iraq as a response to terrorist
attacks conducted by members of Kurdish Worker’s Party. The Turkish government claimed it was acting
because the Iraqi government was unable to prevent the cross-border armed attacks. THOMAS M. FRANCK,
RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTIONS AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 63 (2002).
51. See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 23.
52. See id. at 182-83.
53. See id. at 213-21.
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terrorist installations.54 Breaching the necessary conditions of “state of necessity,” the
acting state could be held accountable for committing an act of aggression. State of
necessity should serve as a proper qualification of the scenario. The main difference
between self-defense and state of necessity in this respect is the nature of the previous
conduct; whereas self-defense requires use of armed force in the form of an armed
attack, state of necessity may be triggered by the existence of imminent danger. There
is no need to ascertain whether the state in question had previously committed an
internationally wrongful act of aggression. This feature renders the state of necessity
doctrine an appropriate tool for averting these types of activities, especially in cases
where the armed attack has not occurred. It is regrettable that the International Law
Commission did not more convincingly articulate an appropriate way to respond to
attacks or danger emanating from the territory of another state.
It should not be forgotten that even the famous Caroline case of 183755
represented, in fact, something very similar to the above-mentioned doctrine of
extraterritorial law enforcement. This relatively “ancient” incident may be viewed
from a modern perspective as an incident involving cross-border use of force to
counter terrorist activity or possibly cross-border support of insurgents. The rebels
against British rule in Canada, together with their American supporters, used the
steamboat Caroline for transporting men and material to an island on the Niagara River
held by the rebels.56 As the British government’s demands for the immediate cessation
of these activities failed, the British military units crossed the border into the United
States and destroyed the steamboat.57 This incident generated an important
correspondence between the United States and Great Britain, setting the standard for
such conduct.
E. Special Modes of Attribution
It can be indicated from the recent decision-making activity of the Security
Council that the council has indirectly addressed the issue of attributing terrorist
attacks to a state. It may be implied that one of the reasons for such a shift is to
overcome the problems regarding the restrictive test of “effective control” adopted in
the Nicaragua case. This new model may be applied to cases where there is not
enough factual evidence to satisfy the “effective control” test. There have been
numerous occasions in which the Security Council requested a certain state or a
territorial sovereign to prevent its territory to be used as a springboard for hostile acts
or acts of international terrorism against a third state.58 In those cases, the Security

54. 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, pt. 1, at 13
(1980), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1980_v2_p1
_e.pdf. The commission expressly listed the following conducts: incursions into foreign territory to prevent
military operations of armed bands, which are preparing to attack the territory of the state; pursuit of armed
bands who had crossed the frontier and have their base in that foreign territory; or protection of the lives
of nationals or other persons attacked by armed groups on the territory of such state. Id. at 39.
55. The Caroline Case, supra note 5.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. For example, the Security Council has urged all states to “[r]efrain from providing any form of
support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts” and to “take the necessary steps
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Council repeatedly requested, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter
(the Charter), specific action from the addressee, and the addressee, be it a state or
other entity, failed to satisfy this request.59 Professor Zimmermann describes this
approach as a “special norm of attribution.”60 The resolution would then serve a lex
specialis, attributing the armed attacks of private persons to the state due to the noncompliance with the previous resolutions.61 Professor Zimmermann strictly
distinguishes between the aforementioned scenario and the mere absence of action by
the host state, as they are significantly different.62 He continues by stating that the
“inaction of the territorial state which has been expressly requested by the Security
Council to take action against armed groups . . . does constitute a specific form of
qualified inaction which in turn must enable states concerned, pending Security
Council action under Chapter VII, to themselves exercise their right of self-defense.”63
It seems that this proposition is based on Article 25 of the Charter, by which all
member states agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present charter.64 Using this “qualified inaction” principle one
might attribute the acts of Hezbollah to Lebanon (2006) and acts of Al-Qaeda to the
Taliban (2001). Numerous Security Council resolutions demanded both entities
(Lebanon and the Taliban) to prevent their territory from being used as a springboard
for the acts of terrorists; in both cases, they failed to do so.65
F. Concluding Remarks
It is beyond any doubt that the standard of “effective control” introduced by the
Nicaragua case seems to be too rigid to meet the current challenges of international
law. International law must find an adequate solution and accommodate the issue of
attribution. It also is undisputed that non-state actors will conduct the majority of
armed attacks in the near future. New rules and a lower standard of attribution should
allow for self-defense in extreme cases of terrorist attacks reaching the level of an
armed attack. Using this lower threshold of attribution, the Taliban and Lebanon could
be held responsible for armed attacks committed by terrorists (i.e., Al-Qaeda and
Hezbollah). Based on this new model of attribution, such an approach would mean
that states who fail in their duty of due diligence may be held responsible for an armed

to prevent the commission of terrorist acts,” S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2 , U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001),
and it has urged the Taliban regime to “cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international
terrorists” and to “take appropriate effective measures to ensure that the territory under its control is not
used for terrorist installations and camps,” S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1267 (Oct. 15,
1999).
59. See, e.g., id. (Taliban’s refusal to take action to eradicate terrorist camps and activities within its
borders).
60. Andreas Zimmermann, The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and the Issue of
Proportionality, 11 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 99, 120 (2007).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 121.
63. Id.
64. U.N. Charter art. 25.
65. See S.C. Res. 1614, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1614 (Jul. 19, 2005); S.C. Res. 1655, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1655
(Jan. 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1363, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (Jul. 30, 2001).
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attack emanating from their territory. It is necessary to point out that the state
concerned would simultaneously be in breach of its international obligations deriving,
inter alia, from Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).66 It is submitted that it is
primarily the International Court of Justice that should consider and elaborate upon this
issue. Despite the fact that there is a manifest trend toward relaxing the traditional
restrictive criteria, it is probably too early to state that there is no state involvement
necessary. In conclusion of this subsection, it needs to be stated that the proper
assessment of the state involvement in terrorist groups’ activities undoubtedly will rely
on the specific features and factual situation of each case.
III. IS AN ATTACK BY A NON-STATE ENTITY AN ARMED ATTACK?
Much attention has been focused on whether an attack by a non-state actor may
be regarded as an armed attack for the purposes of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Unquestionably, states have an inherent right to defend themselves using forcible
measures in self-defense. The state practice and international legal theory is in
disagreement on whether this right can be invoked as a response to a previous terrorist
attack. Terrorist groups, as non-state entities, may certainly inflict the same damage
as an armed attack. Hardly anyone could challenge the argument that the magnitude
of some recent terrorist attacks is comparable to those undertaken by regular state
forces. It is obvious that the framers of the Charter did not anticipate any types of
armed attacks other than those of a state-to-state nature.
Modern history renders the modification of this approach inevitable; it is necessary
to adjust it to the latest developments. All the scenarios mentioned above work from
the premise that a non-state actor’s attack may be regarded as an armed attack. In the
first two scenarios, reasonable evidence indicating that a certain terrorist group as a
non-state entity is accountable for the attack has to be established. Article 51 of the
Charter refers only to the attacked state and makes no reference to the originator of the
attack. The wording “against a Member state” confirms this.67 The wording of Article
51 itself does not indicate whether the attack has to come directly from the state. At
the same time it does not preclude such a reading. This would allow the occurrence
of an armed attack carried out by a non-state actor. Non-state actors—such as
individuals or organized groups—are becoming increasingly important for
international law and are being accorded various norms of behavior. This modern
aspect must be taken into consideration when assessing the latest developments.
Reaching the ultimate aim of the international legal system—promotion of peace
within the international community—is only possible if such a system is fair and able
to safeguard states’ rights against immediate perils. International law must ensure that
attackers will be held responsible and bear the consequences of their previous illegal
activity. If the attacker may hide behind the fact that it is a non-state entity and unable
to carry out an “armed attack,” this would degrade the purpose of and respect for
international law.
Consequently, Article 51 of the Charter does not preclude the armed attack from
being launched by a non-state entity. When analyzing this issue, a very important

66. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
67. U.N. Charter art. 51, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.shtml.
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distinction must be made, as the September 11, 2001, attacks radically changed the
legal framework. Article 51 provides a sufficient legal basis for reinterpretation that
is consistent with the current status quo of international relations.
A. Prior to September 11, 2001
The situation prior to September 11, 2001, indicates that the international
community was rather divided over whether self-defense may serve as a tool in
responding to terrorist attacks by non-state entities. The prevailing view within the
academic community was that an “armed attack” may only emanate from a state as a
specific subject of public international law.68 This pronouncement was reconfirmed
by Judge Kooijmans, who recently explained that the requirement that “[an] armed
attack must come from another state . . . has been the generally accepted interpretation
for more than 50 years.”69 There were only a few states (United States, Belgium, South
Africa, and Israel, in particular) claiming the right to self-defense when undertaking
forcible measures against terrorist bases in other third states. However, it was almost
always contested and condemned by various international forums and by other member
states, and most frequently by the U.N. Security Council. The state practice prior to
September 11, 2001, does not rule out the applicability of self-defense. Although it has
been contested and condemned, as already pointed out, in the details of each case, the
applicability of self-defense to some cases of terrorist attacks as a legal principle was
not disputed at all. What was usually condemned was non-compliance with the
customary principles related to self-defense—necessity and proportionality. Due to the
Cold War atmosphere, some of the anti-terrorist operations were condemned simply
because of political affiliation to one of the two blocks. The Security Council’s
condemnations were thus quite inconsistent, as the council is not an assembly of jurists
or experts on international law. Therefore, some sessions were not supported by the
necessary legal expertise, but rather by exclusively political motives. Professor
William O’Brien very eloquently summarized this feature:
[T]he Security Council record during the period studied is conspicuous for the
scarcity of serious legal arguments. No delegate remotely approached the level of
Bowett’s analyses of reprisals and self-defense. No one even cited his 1972 article.
Other publicists are seldom cited—except by the Israelis.70

Israeli diplomats and political representatives used scholarly literature in support of
their conduct in particular during the Security Council deliberations after the rescue
mission at Entebbe International Airport and after the Osiraq aerial raid.

68. BENEDETTI CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 176 (2000); Eric P. J.
Myjer & Nigel D. White, The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defense?, 7 J. CONFLICT
& SEC. L. 5, 7 (2002); see also Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal
Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 995 (2001); Carsten Stahn, International Law
at a Crossroads? The Impact of September 11, 62 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT
UND VÖLKERRECHT 183, 213-14 (2002).
69. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131.
70. William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence, and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA.
J. INT’L L. 421, 471 (1990).
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As previously stated, there is a wide spectrum of thought in international legal
theory on whether terrorist actions give rise to self-defense. These opinions range from
rather restrictive interpretation (setting a relatively “high threshold”) in a moderate
approach, to a liberal (sometimes called “low threshold”) approach.
The International Court of Justice established the standard of a restrictive
approach, in particular in the 1986 Nicaragua case.71 The court’s construction of a
high threshold for the permissible response in self-defense and its reluctance to extend
the notion of armed attack to instances of state’s logistical and weapons support has
been addressed above.72 Despite criticism, in particular from the United States, the
court’s ruling has attracted the attention of numerous scholars and has had a longlasting influence on the theory.73 The Nicaragua judgment is relevant when speaking
of counterterrorist operations, with the exception that terrorist groups that replaced the
rebels and armed bands pose an even greater threat to the coherence of the
international system. State practice supports this proposition, as the United Nations
denied accepting the exercise of the right of self-defense as a tool for responding to
terrorist attacks. It was primarily Portugal, South Africa, and Israel that claimed the
right of extraterritorial use of force against terrorist bases irrespective of whether the
local state was responsible for the attacks. During the 1980s, the international
community strongly disapproved, for example, of the 1985 Israeli bombardment of
PLO’s Headquarters in Tunisia,74 the U.S. bombing of the Tunisian cities of Tripoli
and Benghazi (1986), or South Africa’s incursion into the territories of neighboring
states,75 primarily into Botswana.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, scholars propose a relatively liberal
approach, which is, as will be shown below, in contrast with the restrictive view.76
These commentators would very likely argue that the drafters of the Charter did not
anticipate the nature of contemporary asymmetric warfare and therefore, it should be
interpreted extensively to include terrorist attacks within the ambit of Article 51. For
example, Professor Alberto R. Coll, who has published extensively on counterterrorist
issues, claimed, “It would be a tragic mistake to interpret Article 51 as an absolute
prohibition on military responses to terrorism,” as Article 51 of the Charter was
construed unequivocally to safeguard and protect states and their inhabitants against
attacks directed from abroad.77 Most proponents of this approach almost unanimously
claim that in the last few decades, terrorist activities have become major sources of
contemporary conflicts and represent a substantial threat to both national and
international security. Therefore, the Charter should be interpreted in accordance with

71. 1986 I.C.J. 14.
72. See supra Part II.B.
73. See, e.g., Frowein, supra note 33, at 64.
74. The Security Council vigorously condemned the Israeli action as “an act of armed aggression
perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”
S.C. Res. 573, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985).
75. S.C. Res. 568, U.N. Doc. S/RES/568 (Jun. 21, 1985) (“South Africa’s recent unprovoked and
unwarranted military attack on the capital of Botswana as an act of aggression against that country and a
gross violation of its territorial integrity and national sovereignty.”).
76. See, e.g., Alberto R. Coll, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 297 (1987); Stephen M. Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense
in Modern International Law, 136 HAGUE RECUEIL 411, 479 (1972).
77. Coll, supra note 76, at 307.
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real threats.78 Probably the most relentless supporter of the liberal approach is former
legal advisor to the U.S. State Department, Professor Abraham D. Sofaer. As he
categorically stated, “The notion that self-defense relates only to a use of force that
materially threatens a state's ‘territorial integrity or political independence,’ as
proscribed in Article 2(4), ignores the Charter's preservation of the ‘inherent’ scope of
that right.”79 When speaking of terrorism, the meaning of “armed attack” should not
be unrealistically and artificially limited because terrorists would have substantial
advantages if attacking democratic, non-aggressive countries.80
There has to be, de lege ferenda, a third possible way, which will moderately and
carefully combine the positive aspects of the two aforementioned approaches and
diminish their deficiencies. Terrorist attacks for these purposes should be set as attacks
with significant scale and effects (as the Nicaragua ruling stated), as though
undertaken by the regular forces of a state; they should not be of sporadic or isolated
nature, but rather campaigns of a continuing pattern. Supposedly, attacks meeting
these conditions could, depending upon the factual situation of each case, give rise to
a response in self-defense. In this regard, it is often argued that many citizens of the
attacked state have to be endangered or attacked to trigger actions in self-defense.
Professor Dinstein held that in the view of official dignitaries or diplomatic envoys,
this would very likely represent an armed attack.81 This conclusion is tenable, as these
individuals for certain specific reasons carry out official or state duties (though for a
limited period of time), and therefore they must be seen as de facto organs of a state.
It very likely would include the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador to
United Kingdom Shlomo Argov in 1982 by two Jordanian terrorists.82 Adopting this
view could render impermissible those forcible responses that were of an isolated
nature, including the 1986 bombing of a West Berlin nightclub frequented by U.S.
military personnel or the killing of three Israeli civilians on their yacht off the coast of
Larnaca, Cyprus.83
Professor Antonio Cassese, one of the leading experts on legal aspects of
terrorism, set the standard for the moderate approach back in 1989.84 He explained
that terrorist action, in order to be ascertained as an armed attack, should be “a very
serious attack either on the territory of the injured state or on its agents or citizens
while at home or abroad in another state or in international waters or airspace,” and
simultaneously, such terrorist acts must “form part of a consistent pattern of violent

78. Professor O’Brien accurately described this feature back in 1990: “Given that much of
contemporary conflict takes form of subversive intervention, exported revolution, indirect aggression, and
transnational revolutionary warfare emphasizing terrorism, strict interpretations of the right of self-defense
against immediate, armed attacks are not compelling.” O’Brien, supra note 70, at 470.
79. Sofaer, supra note 28, at 96.
80. Professor Sofaer also explained: “A view of the meaning of ‘armed attack’ that restricts it to
conventional, ongoing uses of force on the territory of the victim state would as practical matter immunize
those who attack sporadically or on foreign territory, even though they can be counted on to attack specific
states repeatedly.” Id. at 95-96.
81. DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 180.
82. The subsequent events, i.e., the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and expulsion of the PLO therefrom,
however, seem greatly disproportionate in relation to the original armed attack of attempted assassination.
83. Special PLO forces claimed responsibility for killings. In reaction, the Israeli cabinet and the Israeli
Air Force bombed the Tunis headquarters of the PLO, killing or injuring more than one hundred persons.
84. See generally Cassese, supra note 32.
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terrorist action rather than just being isolated or sporadic attacks.”85 One can conclude
from the wording that a terrorist attack on only one individual diplomatic envoy shall
not be considered an armed attack as it does not form a part of a “consistent pattern”
of acts. This contradicts what was argued in the preceding paragraph. Despite the fact
that there was “only” one diplomatic dignitary attacked, the action was, beyond any
doubt, part of a consistent pattern of acts by the Abu Nidal terrorist organization,
which was notorious for attacking Jewish targets and which ultimately claimed
responsibility for this particular attack.
B. Post-September 11, 2001
The attacks perpetrated on September 11, 2001, by terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda
against the United States show that armed attacks launched by non-state entities may
have the same impact and effects as conventional armed attacks launched by states.
The September attacks surely reach the threshold of an armed attack for the purposes
of Article 51 of the Charter. Moreover, after the attacks there have been several
indications that expanding the notion of self-defense is receiving more and more
support from the international community as well as in international legal theory.
These events revived the discussion of whether self-defense might be a legitimate
response to major acts of global international terrorism. Immediately after the terrorist
attacks on the United States, the North Atlantic Council, for the first time in its history,
invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The council issued a statement
declaring:
[W]e consider the events of 11 September to be an armed attack not just on one ally,
but on us all, and have therefore invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty . . . .
[W]e will continue to strengthen our national and collective capacities to protect our
populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack,
directed from abroad.86

From the speech of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, it could be inferred that
the North Atlantic organization opted for a rather extensive notion of an armed attack:
We know that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the worldwide terrorist network of Al-Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden . . . protected by the
Taliban . . . . [I]t has now been determined that the attack against the United States
was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.87

Unlike Security Council resolutions, the reference to the authors of the armed attacks
is, in the case of the NATO statement, quite clear. It is based on the premise that it was
the Taliban regime that enabled the functioning and operation of the Al-Qaeda network
in Afghanistan. Also, it explicitly uses the term “armed attack” in relation to Al-Qaeda
activities. Because NATO is a relatively homogenous and well-organized collection
of countries sharing similar values, consensus is more easily reached. This is one of

85. Cassese, supra note 32, at 596.
86. NATO Press Release M-NAC-2(2001)159, 2001, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/
2001/p01-159e.htm.
87. Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, Statement (Oct. 2, 2001).
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the reasons why NATO could elaborate on the issue in more detail than the Security
Council could in its resolutions. Furthermore, unlike the Security Council, the North
Atlantic Council relied on detailed information from the United States government
regarding the background of the armed attacks.
Self-defense as a potential measure for combating terrorism was referred to in
Security Council Resolution 1368, which implicitly recognized in the context of the
September 11 bombing the “inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in
accordance with the Charter.”88 This proclamation does not mean, per se, that selfdefense is a legitimate response to acts of terrorism.89 Nevertheless, the Security
Council at least considered this issue in relation to terrorist attacks.90 It was not an
unprecedented decision in the history of the Security Council. In November 1967, the
Security Council dealt with the Democratic Republic of Congo following the armed
attacks committed against its territory. Mercenaries had committed attacks from
neighboring Angola, which was under Portuguese administration at the time. Although
the council did not explicitly recognize the right of self-defense, it declared the attacks
of mercenaries across international borders emanating from another state as “armed
attacks.”91
No Security Council document linked the attacks to any state entity or
personalized the attackers. The council only referred to general duties contained in the
General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations,92 explicating the duty of
every state to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, participating in terrorist
acts in another state, or acquiescing to organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts.93 There seems to have been an assertion of the

88. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). This resolution was reaffirmed few days
later in another Security Council resolution. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 66.
89. However, it is important to note that the author cannot find any rule in public international law that
would prohibit the applicability of the right of self-defense to major acts of international terrorism.
90. The Organization of American States addressed the issue in similar manner. At the meeting of its
ministers on September 21, 2001, the organization adopted a Resolution on Strengthening Hemispheric
Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism, which recognized “the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the Charters of Organization of American States
and the United Nations.” ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, STRENGTHENING HEMISPHERIC
COOPERATION TO PREVENT, COMBAT, AND ELIMINATE TERRORISM (2001),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/oas_0921b.htm. The Council of Ministers further declared:
[T]hese terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks against all
American states and that in accordance with all the relevant provisions of the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the principle of continental
solidarity, all states [who are] parties to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal
assistance to address such attacks and the threat of any similar attacks against any American
state, and to maintain the peace and security of the continent.
ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, TERRORIST THREAT TO THE AMERICAS (2001),
http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/RC.24e.htm.
91. As a result, Portugal was condemned by the Security Council for its failure to prevent mercenaries
from using the territory of Angola as a base of operations for armed attacks. S.C. Res. 241, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/241 (Nov. 15, 1967).
92. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/8082/Annex (Oct. 24, 1970).
93. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 66.
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Security Council at the time that a terrorist attack does not necessarily have to be
imputed to a state in order to trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the
Charter.
International legal theory is not in concert with the association of major acts of
international terrorism and the right of self-defense. To a certain extent, the Security
Council’s reference to the “inherent right of self-defense” is not without problems. On
one hand, it indirectly proposes the association of the terrorist attacks with the right of
self-defense, while, on the other hand, it defines terrorist attacks, as opposed to armed
attacks, as only a threat to the peace. As the Security Council is not purely a legal
body, it perhaps did not pay much attention to this issue. In the view of Professor
Cassese, these aspects do not clarify the legal issue but conversely, render the
resolution too “ambiguous and contradictory.”94 It is true that the reference to the right
of self-defense in both documents is contained in their preamble, but it should not
reduce the validity of such a statement.
In this respect, one should not forget that even the most celebrated “self-defense”
case—the Caroline case—which had long-lasting effects on the formation of the right
of self-defense, involved an attack launched by a non-state entity. The extensive
correspondence between United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster and his
British counterpart Lord Ashburton does not restrict the applicability of the right of
self-defense to armed attacks launched exclusively by states. Therefore, it may be
implied that customary law of self-defense is not exclusively directed at the state.
IV. RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
A. The Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion
Recently, the International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion regarding the
legal effects of Israel’s construction of a wall in Palestine territory, addressed the
“state-to-state” nature of an armed attack. Although it did not address the issue of selfdefense in full, the opinion deserves attention. In fact, the decision represents the first
time the court had the opportunity to discuss the claims of self-defense invoked against
armed attacks conducted by non-state actors. The court, in dismissing the Israeli claim,
rather surprisingly affirmed the position that the invocation of the right of self-defense
pursuant to Article 51 is strictly limited to an armed attack undertaken by another state.
The court stated:
Article 51 of the Charter . . . recognizes the existence of an inherent right of selfdefense in the case of armed attack by one state against another state. However, Israel
does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign state. The Court
also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that,
as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of the
wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different
from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373
(2001), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support
of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defense. Consequently, the Court concludes
that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.95

94. Cassese, supra note 32, at 996.
95. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J.
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The court’s majority simply regarded the invocation of the right of self-defense
as inapplicable because, inter alia, the attacks were not attributable, or imputable, to
any foreign state. The court’s majority seems to indicate adherence to a restrictive
interpretation of Article 51. The court was far from being unanimous when delivering
the opinion, with Judges Buergenthal, Kooijmans, and Higgins dissenting on this
specific point. Judge Buergenthal criticized the court for a “formalistic” approach to
the right of self-defense, which prevented the court from addressing issues that were
“at the heart of [the] case.”96 In fact, he straightforwardly challenged the final ruling
of the court for adopting such a restrictive interpretation of Article 51.97 This critique
seems justified, as the court could have confronted its opinion with the current state
practice.
With obvious regret, Judge Kooijmans argued that the court did not draw enough
attention to Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, and in particular, to how they
qualified acts of international terrorism without attributing them to particular state.98
In this respect, Judge Kooijmans pronounced that “this new element, the legal
implications of which cannot as yet be assessed but which marks undeniably a new
approach to the concept of self-defense.”99 It is impossible to tell if the Security
Council will follow and reiterate the approach introduced by Resolutions 1368 and
1373, until the Security Council acts. The existence of dissenting opinions within such
a highly respected judicial body indicates that the jurisprudence of the court is
inconsistent and that the “new” interpretation has not yet received universal
acceptance.

136, 194 [hereinafter Israeli Wall]. The state of Israel based the construction of the wall on its inherent
right of self-defense. The purpose of the wall was to defend itself against attacks by non-state entities
emanating from the occupied territories. During the subsequent debate in the General Assembly, the Israel
Ambassador Dan Gillerman also noted the Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), as
they “have clearly recognized the right of States to use force in self-defence against terrorist attacks, and
therefore surely recognize the right to use non-forcible measures to that end.” U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/PV.21,
at 6 (2003).
96. Israeli Wall, 2004 I.C.J. at 243 (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal).
97. Judge Buergenthal stated that the conclusion of the court in this respect is “dubious” and further
stated that “the United Nations Charter, in affirming the inherent right of self-defence, does not make its
exercise dependent upon an armed attack by another state.” Id. at 242 (separate opinion of Judge
Buergenthal). In support of his view, he mentions Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which did
not “limit their application to terrorist attacks by state actors only, nor was an assumption to that effect
implicit in these resolutions. In fact, the contrary appears to have been the case.” Id. In her dissenting
opinion, Judge Rosalyn Higgins stated the following: “There is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article
51 that thus stipulates that self-defense is available only when an armed attack is made by a state.” Israeli
Wall, 2004 I.C.J. at 215 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
98. As far as these two resolutions are concerned, the court stated that they are not relevant because
“Israel regards the threat that creates a need for the wall as internal, not external.” Israeli Wall, 2004 I.C.J.
at 230 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
99. Judge Kooijmans submitted that the aforesaid Security Council resolutions qualified the acts of
international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security without assigning these acts to
particular state. As he stated, this is “a completely new element in these resolutions. This new element is
not excluded by the terms of Article 51 since this conditions the exercise of the inherent right of selfdefense on a previous attack without saying that this armed attack must come from another state.” Israeli
Wall, 2004 I.C.J. at 230 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).

156

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

B. The Congo Decision
In its ruling, Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,100 the
International Court of Justice was presented with another opportunity to address the
issue of whether attacks by irregulars from the territory of one state against another
state may trigger the right of self-defense.101 Clarification and lowering the high
standard of attribution in accordance with the rules on responsibility of states would
be desirable primarily in the light of worldwide threats of terrorist attacks. The court
decided not to expressly address this issue, arguing that there is “no need to respond
. . . as to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides
for a right of self-defense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.”102 The court
thus avoided entering into a detailed discussion about self-defense or the principles of
attribution. This approach adopted by the court is rather surprising, as both parties
emphasized the issues of self-defense and the attribution of terrorist attacks in detail.
Special reference must be made to conflicting submissions of the agents of the parties,
presented by Professor Ian Brownlie (on behalf of Uganda) and Professor Pierre Klein
(representing Congo). In oral pleadings, Professor Brownlie argued on behalf of
Uganda that the Nicaragua test of “effective control” is no longer valid in such
situations:
[A]rmed attacks by armed bands whose existence is tolerated by the territorial
sovereign generate legal responsibility and therefore constitute armed attacks for the
purpose of Article 51. And thus, there is a separate, a super-added standard of
responsibility, according to which a failure to control the activities of armed bands,
creates a susceptibility to action in self-defense by neighboring states.103

In response to the Ugandan allegation, the Congolese attorney, Professor Klein,
strongly dismissed the existence of any super-added responsibility on the Congolese
side arguing that:
to assimilate mere tolerance by the territorial sovereign of armed groups on its
territory with an armed attack clearly runs counter to the most established principles
in such matters. That position, which consists of considerably lowering the threshold

100. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Dec. 19, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 71 [hereinafter Congo].
101. The Ugandan government was accused by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) of an act
of aggression within the meaning of Article I of the Definition of Aggression set out in General Assembly
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974, and in contravention of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
Id. at 276. As a matter of fact, Uganda further was accused of committing repeated violations of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and their Additional Protocols of 1977 were in flagrant disregard of the
elementary rules of international humanitarian law. Id. at 312. Additionally, Uganda was accused of
committing massive violations of human rights in the conflict zones, a breach of international human rights
law. Id. at 312-13. The Ugandan authorities tried to justify their military operations in the territory of
Congo as a lawful exercise of the right of self-defense against cross-border attacks by Ugandan insurgents
from the Congolese territory. Id. at 313.
102. The court also ruled that “the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of self-defence by
Uganda against the DRC were not present.” Id. at 306.
103. See Transcript of Petitioner’s Oral Argument at 30, Congo, Dec. 19, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 71.
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required for the establishment of aggression, obviously finds no support in the
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.104

Professor Brownlie seemed to support the broader reading of Article 51 proposing
that harboring terrorists and armed bands may become, under standard principles of
state responsibility, imputable to such a state. As can be seen from the Congolese
response, this argument was not accepted because the mere “acknowledgment” of the
existence of armed bands on its own territory is not equal to “tolerance” as inferred by
Brownlie. It is submitted that such approach is not “deficient in law,” as the Congolese
attorney remarked. It reflects a modern situation and in particular, modern threats of
terrorism and armed bands operation. The approach correctly lowers the threshold for
imputation and reflects current developments, and it can be inferred based on the final
ruling of the court that it did not want to take any firm position or comment on the
principle of “super-added” responsibility for harboring terrorists.
The court analyzed the questions of whether there had been an actual armed attack
on Uganda, and if so, whether the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was
responsible for the attack. Ultimately, the court found no satisfactory evidence that the
government of the DRC was involved in the attacks. Therefore, the court rejected
Uganda’s claim of self-defense under Article 51 of the charter. The court also upheld
that Uganda had violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, and that
“the unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and duration
that the court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force
expressed in Art. 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter.”105
Several judges critically observed that the court escaped its opportunity “to clarify
the state of law on a highly controversial matter which is marked by great controversy
and confusion—not the least because it was the court itself that has substantially
contributed to this confusion by its Nicaragua judgement of two decades ago.”106 Note
that the strongest critics of the majority’s ruling were Judges Simma and Kooijmans,
who made clearer positions on the issue of self-defense. Judge Simma was extremely
critical of the fact that the court maintained its restrictive reading of Article 51, without
taking recent developments into account, such as “Security Council resolutions 1368
(2001) and 1373 (2001) [that] cannot but be read as an affirmations of the view that
large-scale attacks by non-state actors can qualify as ‘armed attacks’ within the
meaning of Article 51.”107 Both judges seemed to emphasise two scenarios: first, the
attacks are not attributable to the respective state under general rules of state
responsibility; and, second, where the government control has failed thus allowing the

104. See Transcript of Respondent’s Oral Argument at 26, Congo, Dec. 19, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 71.
105. Congo, 45 I.L.M. at 308-09.
106. Id. at 370 (separate opinion of Judge Simma). Similarly, Judge Kooijmans critically assessed this
feature:
[T]he Court refrains from taking a position with regard to the question whether the threshold
set out in the Nicaragua Judgment is still in conformity with contemporary international law
in spite of the fact that that threshold has been subject to increasingly severe criticism ever
since it was established in 1986. The Court thus has missed a chance to fine-tune the
position it took 20 years ago.
Id. at 357 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
107. Id. at 370 (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
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territory to be used by terrorists, i.e., the so-called “failed” states. Judge Kooijmans,
fully supported by Judge Simma on this point, stated that “if armed attacks are carried
out by irregular bands from such territory against a neighboring state, they are still
armed attacks even if they cannot be attributed to the territorial state. It would be
unreasonable to deny the attacked state the right of self-defense merely because there
is no attacker state, and the Charter does not so require.”108
As Professor Zimmermann remarked, the court seems to have deviated from the
approach taken in its Israeli Wall advisory opinion.109 In the Congo case, he argues,
the court did not adopt any rigid approach on this matter. Professor Zimmermann’s
remarks are certainly correct but it is submitted, however, that the court should have
reconsidered its previous restrictive opinion delivered in its Israeli Wall advisory
opinion and updated its jurisprudence in the light of current developments. It is
apparent, irrespective of several separate opinions to the contrary, that the court
reaffirmed the traditionally restrictive approach. The court seems to be too cautious
to broaden the scope of self-defense and to recognize this right as a lawful response to
armed attacks by non-state actors without another state’s involvement. Such
pronouncements may have a negative impact on state practice, as they will tend to
bypass Article 51, finding alternative ways of justifying their uses of force. This
approach is detrimental to member states, as they will be less likely to rely on selfdefense in cases of asymmetric or low-level warfare committed by terrorist groups. As
Dr. Stahn remarked, maintaining the restrictive view affirmed by the court could
increase the overreliance of member states on non-written exceptions of Article 2(4).110
In fact, this scenario could lead to the erosion of the normative principles contained in
Article 2(4).
C. Concluding Remarks
The abovementioned resolutions, scholarly literature, and separate opinions of
several judges of the International Court of Justice highlight an extremely important
point: the question of broadening the notion of armed attack and self-defense as a
whole.111 It can be argued that, following the September 11, 2001, attacks, basically

108. Id. at 358 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
109. Zimmermann, supra note 60, at 116.
110. See generally Carsten Stahn, “Nicaragua Is Dead, Long Live Nicaragua”—The Right to SelfDefense under Art. 51 U.N. Charter and International Law, in TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE FOR
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY? 827, 842 (Christian Walter et al., eds.
2004); Christian J. Tams, Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law of Self-Defense in the Wall
Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963, 976 (2005).
111. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 32, at 996-97. Cassese provided:
It would thus seem that that in a matter of a few days, practically all states, (all members of
the Security Council plus members of NATO other than those sitting on the Security
Council plus all states that have not objected to resort to Article 51) have come to assimilate
a terrorist attack by a terrorist organization to an armed aggression by a state, entitling the
victim to resort to individual self-defense.
Id. See also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 165 (2nd ed. 2004) (“It seems
clear from the international reaction at the time that the members of the Security Council were in fact
willing to accept the use of force in self-defense by the USA in response to the terrorist attacks.”);
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1028 (5th ed. 2003) (“Accordingly, the members of both these
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all nineteen member states of NATO consented to a more expansive conception of an
“armed attack.” Moreover, the fifteen members of the Security Council and almost
thirty members of the Organization of the American States at least implicitly associated
the terrorist attacks with the inherent right of self-defense. It is probably too early to
state that there might be a new norm of customary law widening the scope of legitimate
self-defense as stipulated in Article 51 of the charter being formed; however, the
adoption of the wording in the aforementioned resolutions and proclamations
demonstrates the willingness of a considerable number of states to accept the
applicability of the right of self-defense to acts of terrorism in extreme cases. The
resolutions affirm a certain trend that has been progressing within the international
community in the last decade. At the same time, it would be fallacious to conclude that
the opinio juris of states confirms the existence of a new rule of customary law. It will
take time to reconcile the divergence between the recent jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice and current state practice. One aspect must be taken for
granted: the ultimate aim of the Charter is to safeguard the security of its member states
so that they are not left without remedy after being victimized by an armed attack.
Therefore, by adopting the teleological interpretation of Article 51, one may conclude
that this article primarily addresses the victimized state irrespective of where the armed
attack originated or who was the attacker.
V. CONDITIONS FOR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM
If it is taken for granted that terrorist acts might trigger self-defense, one has to
consider the specific conditions which will ultimately render a self-defense response
as legitimate. Responses to terrorism must conform to traditional conditions of
immediacy, necessity, and proportionality.
Traditionally, self-defense responses must be an immediate reaction to the
previous armed attack: the defensive measures must be exercised within a reasonable
time frame after the attack. Should an unreasonable amount of time elapse between the
original armed attack and the defensive response, the reaction could be rendered
illegal. Timely response is therefore of the utmost importance. A delayed response
might indicate that the action is of a retaliatory nature or an armed reprisal. Fulfilment
of this condition—as well as the other two conditions stated below—will need to be
assessed in light of the uniqueness of each case. Reasonable time delay due to
geographical remoteness or material, financial, or military preparations of the attacked
state is, of course, acceptable. When speaking of terrorism, the establishment of the
condition of timeliness is not without problems, as the international legal doctrine is
definitely not in concert. Some scholars would argue that defensive response is only
possible against an actual or imminent armed attack as it might be misused as a pretext
for aggressive intentions.112 Other scholars—proponents of the liberal view—even

alliances [NATO and the Organization of American States] accepted that what had happened on 11
September constituted an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter.”).
112. For example, Professor Francis A. Boyle remarked at the 1987 American Society of International
Law’s discussion on terrorism that “an expansive reading of the doctrine of self-defense to include
retaliation and reprisal would provide gratuitously ample grounds for many other states to come up with
all sorts of justifications and pretexts for engaging in the threat and use of force that could significantly
undermine international peace and security.” Boyle, supra note 34, at 294-95.
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argue that self-defense is not the only possible reaction available to a state in such
situations, as there is always room for acts of reprisals instead of self-defense.113
Despite the controversy surrounding armed reprisals, Professor William O’Brien
comments that they should be assimilated “into the right of legitimate self-defense.”114
A strong follower of the liberal approach, Professor Abraham Sofaer, proposes that
self-defense as a measure against terrorism might be used in a preventative or
anticipatory manner. He stated that:
A sound construction of Article 51 would allow any state, once a terrorist “attack
occurs” or is about to occur, to use force against those responsible for the attack in
order to prevent the attack or to deter further attacks unless reasonable ground exists
to believe that no further attack will be undertaken.115

If one of the article’s priorities is to solve international disputes by peaceful means,
then a certain time lag between the original terrorist attack and the deployment of
defensive force is logically necessary. The use of force in self-defense should
represent the last possible resort. Therefore, states faced with imminent peril should
be allowed some lag time in order to negotiate and find a peaceful non-forcible
settlement. Arguments about reprisals should not be accepted, as their position in
international law is highly controversial, and the majority of states and scholars seem
to regard them as being impermissible.
The principle of necessity compels the defending state to show “necessity for selfdefense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation,” and such a state is also required to do “nothing unreasonable or
excessive.”116 The principle of necessity should justify any abuse of sovereignty of a
state where the terrorist network or group operates. Necessity requires, first, the
exhaustion of alternative peaceful measures before employing force. It is desirable that
the territorial state should remove the threat itself. If unable to do so, it could accept
help from the victimized state. Accepting the help of the local state, within whose
borders the terrorists operate, could also show that the defensive state’s intentions are
clear and that it was truly unable to remove the threat itself. An appeal to the Security
Council by the victimized state is also an alternative.
The condition of proportionality requires the response to be proportional in degree
and scope to the original threat or attack. As the purpose of the defensive action is to
end or repel the attack, the level or scope of defensive force does not always have to
be in strict correspondence with the original force or the antecedent coercion.
Sometimes the degree of defensive force has to be higher because the defending state’s
aim is to diminish or paralyze the attacker’s capacity to proceed in launching the armed
attack or continue in the aggression. Once the military objective of defensive action
is fulfilled, the action itself must cease. Some authors, such as O’Brien, have advanced
a view that, in some specific cases, the defensive counterterrorism measures should be

113. Professor Coll argued that “the evidence seems to suggest the continuing relevance of reprisals in
the face of U.N. impotence to provide its members with protection against illegal uses of force.” Coll,
supra note 76, at 302-03.
114. O’Brien, supra note 70, at 476.
115. Sofaer, supra note 28, at 95.
116. R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1938).

2009]

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

161

seen “in the total context of hostilities as well as the broader political-military strategic
context.”117 At the same time the defensive measures taken should also serve the
purpose of certain deterrent and to persuade the would-be aggressor not to engage in
such a course of action. Professor Oscar Schachter concluded:
If proportionality consists of a reasonable relation of means to ends, it would not be
disproportionate if in some cases the retaliatory force exceeded the original attack in
order to serve its deterrent aim. One might say that the force would have to be
sufficient to cause the terrorist to change his expectations about costs and benefits so
that he would cease terrorist activity.118

This view is applicable to a very limited number of cases in which the pattern of
terrorist activity is long-lasting and seriously threatens the victimized state. But the
overreliance on strategic concepts and considerations could be dangerous, as it could
override legal considerations and thus render the defensive reaction highly
questionable or even impermissible.
When discussing proportionality and terrorist attacks, some scholars strongly
support the doctrine of cumulative proportionality. The requirement of proportionality
is very closely linked to another important issue: legitimacy of the target of the
defensive force against terrorism. The United Nations Security Council Resolution
1368 recognized the right of self-defense in the context of terrorist attacks.119 However, it remained silent over the issue of the permissive targets of such defensive
operations.
Logically one would suppose that defensive force should be strictly limited to the
purpose thereof, namely to the destruction of the military or terrorist objective,
including the infrastructure and training facilities. In these situations, force should be
used only against terrorist targets, excluding military installations or forces of the
respective state. However, this only applies to those situations in which there is no
complicity of the state with the operation of terrorist groups. Unfortunately, the reality
is not so straightforward, as there are various concepts and doctrines describing the
potential targets. As indicated above, there remains the sensitive issue of targeting a
potentially innocent state.
Therefore, this issue deserves more attention. It should be mentioned at the very
beginning that whatever approach is adopted, the defensive action would have to
comply with the relevant principles of international humanitarian law, which mainly
involves rules proscribing the targeting of civilians or exposing civilian property to
excessive damage or destruction. This is what renders forcible counterterrorism
measures highly debatable, as terrorists intentionally keep their bases in denselypopulated areas. Terrorists rely on the fact that forcible response against them will—to
a certain, though limited, extent—cause civilian casualties and will very likely be
condemned by the international community. It requires states that are contemplating
using force against terrorists to calculate and plan very precisely the actual target of its
forcible action. Target selection becomes an issue of utmost importance. The

117. O’Brien, supra note 70, at 477.
118. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1637
(1984).
119. See supra note 88.
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international legal doctrine is divided on the issue in its assessment of whether specific
counterterrorism measures were discriminate or indiscriminate. This division is
remarkable in the case of the United States’ bombing of Libya in 1986. For example,
Professor Francis Boyle critically commented: “The Reagan administration must have
known that to launch a large-scale bombing operation on the compound in the middle
of the night when visibility would have been diminished significantly only could have
resulted in the large-scale loss of innocent human lives.”120 In conclusion, the civilian
casualties were relatively excessive. According to sources, approximately thirty-seven
civilians were killed during the air raid.121
VI. THE AIR STRIKES ON SUDAN AND AFGHANISTAN OF 1998
The below-mentioned incidents in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 seem to indicate
that the practice of states has changed significantly as the phenomenon of state
terrorism and terrorism in general has grown in magnitude.
On August 7, 1998, two car bombs exploded at the United States embassies in the
East African capital cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. These
attacks killed more than 220 people, including twelve American citizens and their
family members. In addition, the attacks injured more than 4,000 Kenyans,
Tanzanians, and Americans, and severely damaged official American installations.
In response, the United States ordered the launch of a series of cruise-missile
strikes on terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan, known as “Operation Infinite
Reach,” on August 20, 1998. In his speech on the same day, President Clinton stated,
“With the compelling evidence that the bin Laden network of terrorist groups was
planning to mount further attacks against Americans, . . . the United States carried out
simultaneous strikes against terrorist facilities and infrastructure in Afghanistan . . . .
Our forces also attacked a factory in Sudan associated with the bin Laden network.”122
The United States’ bombings represented unilateral uses of force against the
territorial integrity of two sovereign members of the United Nations. Such an incident
normally would be regarded as a prima facie violation of public international law.
Therefore, the raid might only be justified if it fell under the exception of self-defense.
This also was the sole legal justification used by the United States. The Security
Council reported that the United States’ response to the series of the armed attacks
against the United States embassies and nationals constituted the exercise of the right
of self-defense.123 The defensive measures targeted Afghanistan’s terrorist training

120. Boyle, supra note 34, at 296. For a contrary assessment, see, for example, Lieutenant Colonel
Gregory F. Intoccia, who stated that the “majority of areas struck by American bombs in the April strike
were military targets . . . . At least some civilian casualties were due to Libyan military structures placed
so close to civilian sites.” Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 177, 211 (1987). In this respect, Intoccia also stated that only a
limited number of bombs dropped impacted the civilians. Id.
121. A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 295
(1997).
122. President William Clinton, Presidential Address (Aug. 20, 1998), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july_dec98/clinton2_8-20.html.
123. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations,
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (Aug. 20, 1998).
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camps, installations, and supply facilities under the control of the bin Laden
organization, which was supporting terrorist actions against the United States and other
countries. In Sudan, U.S. missile strikes targeted the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant
near Khartoum, which was allegedly used for the production of chemical and
biological weapons.
In order to assess the legality of the defensive measures, it is important to assess
whether the conditions of necessity and proportionality were met. The United States
supported the fulfilment of the condition of necessity by reference to the fact that
repeated efforts to convince the government of Sudan and the Taliban regime to “shut
these terrorist activities down and to cease their cooperation with the bin Laden
organization” proved unsuccessful.124 As far as the proportionality of the missile strike
is concerned, United States Ambassador Richardson declared: “[T]he targets struck,
and the timing and method of attack used, were carefully designed to minimize the
risks of collateral damage to civilians and to comply with international law, including
the rules of necessity and proportionality.”125 The issue, however, is not without its
problems. Because the missiles struck two sovereign states, each attack will be
analyzed separately. It is also because of the fact that one of them did not meet the
customary requirements of the lawful exercise of the right of self-defense. This is the
reason for the striking difference in how the international community approved or
disapproved of the two incidents.
The missile strike on Afghanistan attracted little criticism. It therefore can be
assumed that the international community did accept the United States’ self-defense
justification, including the necessary conditions thereof. Many democratic countries
were supportive of the American strike, particularly the United Kingdom, Australia,
France, Germany, Japan, and Spain. In contrast, some countries that have been traditional opponents of American foreign policy condemned the strike. These included
Iran, Iraq, Russia, Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen.126 The chairmen of the African Group,
Arab Group, and Group of Islamic States within the United Nations in their letters did
not address the issue at all, which is in striking contrast to the reaction to the Sudan
strike. From this absence of disapproval, at least tacit approval of the legality of the
strike can be inferred. There also was no recourse to United Nations bodies or
agencies following this strike.
The missile strike on the Sudan was criticized widely. Before the bombing, the
Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant was Sudan’s major producer of chemicals used in the
field of agriculture and veterinary medicine. The United States administration justified
the raid on the grounds that it allegedly was involved in the production of chemical
weapons and that it had strong ties to the bin Laden organization. The decision to
strike was taken after concluding that the soil samples from the site—taken by a

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Apart from condemnation of the United States missile strike, Pakistan also protested against the
violation of its airspace—some of the missiles apparently had flown over its territory. Pakistan hoped that
there would have been prior consultation before this action was launched. See Letter from Ahmad Kamil,
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/794 (Aug. 24, 1998); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 161, 164-65 (1999).
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clandestine Central Intelligence Agency operation—of the chemical plant contained
components of an acid that might serve as a precursor of VX nerve gas. Moreover, in
the view of the United States, the plant was heavily guarded and showed a suspicious
lack of ordinary commercial activities. There is little doubt that the raid was exercised
on the basis of inadequate and false evidence. Not long after the raid, there was
suspicion that the connections between the Al-Shifa and bin Laden were too indirect
and there were no nerve gas chemicals being made there. The international
community’s response, with the exception of the United Kingdom, Australia, France,
Germany, Japan, and Spain, was overwhelmingly negative. There were many
organizations or groups of states that explicitly criticized the raid.127 For example, the
chairmen of the African Group, Arab Group and Group of Islamic States within the
United Nations individually asked the Security Council, via letter, to convene an urgent
meeting and to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Sudan to establish the facts
surrounding the activities of the pharmaceutical plant.
How should the raids be characterised under international law? Were these two
incidents a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense? Assessing the raids as
retaliatory actions renders them illegal under international law; therefore, the
customary elements of self-defense need to be considered—namely, proportionality
and necessity. There is only a little doubt that the bombings on the embassies can be
considered as armed attacks for the purposes of Article 51 of the charter. The
diplomatic missions are the inviolable property of the home, and, in this case, the
targeted state. The United States claimed that the information in their possession
indicated bin Laden’s intention to strike again and to prepare future attacks. The raid
on Afghanistan targeted not only terrorist camps and facilities, but also a meeting of
bin Laden’s advisors who were allegedly planning other attacks of the American
targets. Another element of necessity is the duty to resolve the matter through
diplomatic negotiation and by exhaustion of the appropriate peaceful channels.
Moreover, it would be unrealistic to conclude that the United States could have averted
the danger through negotiations with the Taliban or bin Laden’s representatives. In
this respect, it may be held that such negotiations were practically impossible, as bin

127. The representative of Kuwait to the United Nations conveyed the statement of the League on Arab
States (as a chairman thereof) in which he strongly criticized the United States’ “blatant act of violation of
the sovereignty of a state member of the League of Arab States.” U.N. Doc. S/1998/789 (Aug. 21, 1998).
The secretariat of the league also called upon the United States:
[A]s a permanent member of the Council and as a super-power with global responsibility
for maintaining international peace and security, to respect international legality and to
refrain from such acts which constitute violations of national sovereignty, instigate feelings
of public outrage and encourage violence and counter-violence, thus endangering
international peace and security.
Id.; Letter from the Permanent Representative of Sudan to the United Nations, Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/786 (Aug. 21, 1998); Letter from the Permanent Representative
of Namibia to the United Nations, Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/1998/802 (Aug. 25, 1998) (acting as the chairman of the African Group); Letter from the Charge
D’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations, Addressed to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/791 (Aug. 21, 1998) (acting as the chairman of the Arab Group);
Letter from the Charge D’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations, Addressed
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/790 (Aug. 21, 1998) (acting as the chairman
of the Group of Islamic states).

2009]

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

165

Laden’s network operates under strict secrecy. At the same time, there was little doubt
that the terrorists were operating from the bases in Afghanistan and that there was a
link between the embassy bombings and the targets struck by the United States raid.
These conclusions seem to indicate a necessity to strike. If one considers proportionality as a necessary amount of force to forestall the immediate danger or to repel the
attack, it can be concluded that the strike fulfilled such condition.
Establishing the condition of necessity in the Sudan case seems to be highly
questionable. With reference to the Osiraq case of 1981,128 which concerned the
bombing of a nuclear reactor under construction, it is not accepted as a legitimate
argument for self-defense if the apparent danger of an armed attack is too distant.
Moreover, the link or causal relationship between the attacks on embassies and the
pharmaceutical plant is also questionable. It is doubtful whether the respective plant
posed any danger to the United States’ security; there was no imminent danger.129 The
United States probably should have used diplomatic channels first to resolve the issue
of the plant and its alleged production of chemical weapons. The administration did
not provide sufficient evidence to prove that there was any real danger. If one of the
two aforementioned conditions is not met, the action is not rendered self-defensive.
This is the case for the Sudan bombing. If the necessity principle is left aside, then it
can be concluded that the aerial raid also was not proportional to the potential threat.
The situation definitely did not necessitate the complete destruction of the factory; the
appropriate measure should have been an appeal to the Security Council to send United
Nations weapon inspectors to Sudan.
In both cases, however, the arguments of the United States have serious
deficiencies that render it difficult to make a legal assessment of the forcible response.
The United States based its justification on the existence of reliable intelligence
information, which it subsequently never disclosed. The international community thus
did not have the information necessary to assess the action; it is in this respect very
difficult to establish whether the conditions of necessity and proportionality have been
satisfied. Without this information, it is also very difficult to assess the exact
involvement of Afghanistan and Sudan in the terrorist plots. Nevertheless, it is quite
surprising that most states—particularly Afghanistan—at least tacitly approved of the
action even without such information.
This incident shows that there is a certain shift in the states’ perception of the
imminence of terrorist attacks and their capacity to strike basically anywhere. In other
words, there is an evident shift towards the broader definition of armed attack. Lowintensity warfare, asymmetric warfare of terrorist groups, and state-sponsored terrorism
has progressed rapidly in recent decades. It is now more evident than ever that an
attack does not have to be exercised by scores of tanks or airplanes in order to reach
the threshold of an armed attack. There are other modern modes of warfare that can

128. For more information on the factual background of this matter, see TIMOTHY L. H. MCCORMACK,
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 15 (1996).
129. It also was alleged by numerous journalists that the decision to bomb the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical
plant already had been adopted months before the actual aerial campaign took place. If true, this
information raises serious questions as to whether the United States was actually facing imminent threat.
See Vernon Loeb & Bradley Graham, Sudan Plant Was Probed Months before Attack, WASH. POST, Sept.
1, 1998, at A14.
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inflict extremely grave injury on a foreign state or its nationals that are comparable to
the damage more conventional warfare would cause. This approach requires extensive
reading of the charter in order to accommodate such dramatic change. One might see
this new approach on the cases described above. The approach has caused friction and
tension within the international community of states, which has primarily shown its
attitude to self-defense claims.
It seems that the United States’ perception of the wider concept of self-defense and
armed attack might have an effect on the progressive development of international law.
The potential danger rests in the fact that this development is not fully consistent with
the spirit of the Charter—limitation of unilateral use of force by a state—and might
lead to the cycle of violence or revenge. At the same time, states may feel that use of
force such as the missile strike can sometimes be the only realistic tool to prevent the
danger of terrorism. In this regard, one must distinguish between an action in selfdefense and a forcible action of a retaliatory nature. Whereas the former is a lawful
use of force, the latter is a contravention of the charter.
VII. CONCLUSION
Special attention should be paid to the broadening interpretation of the right of
self-defense in relation to acts of international terrorism. The magnitude and
consequences of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States have
undoubtedly changed the international legal framework regarding the use of force
against terrorism. It is desirable to establish, de lege ferenda, a specific set of rules
that will address the issue of legitimate responses to terrorism. One option, as
described above, is the extended right of self-defense encompassing the extensive
interpretation of the notion of self-defense. In particular, it should be made clear under
what precise conditions member states might legally employ force in self-defense if a
non-state actor attacks them. This is a crucial issue and, in this respect, international
law has to accommodate the contemporary nature of international relations and modern
threats. At the same time, one has to bear in mind that the issue of responding by force
to non-state actors might negatively affect innocent states. It is very likely that terrorist
groups will operate from the territory of another state.
The new concept of an extended right of self-defense would have to safeguard that
only those who have harbored, assisted, or hosted terrorists on their own territory
might become targets of forcible measures taken in self-defense. In this respect, force
could not be used as a pretext for forcible occupation or removal of an unfriendly
regime. There must be an objective process whereby a robust fact-finding
authority—ideally under the auspices of the Security Council or any other impartial
international body—would enable impartial assessment of the factual relationship
between the host state and the terrorist group.130 Before a state employs defensive
measures it should be obliged to present unambiguous, reliable, and credible evidence
legitimizing the use of force. There must be a process in place stipulating conditions

130. First, it is submitted that the host state would have to be given the chance to take its own reasonable
and effective steps to remove or extinguish the threat. If this is not possible, or the measures proved
inefficient, then the victimized state should be allowed to use limited force in self-defense with the limited
objective of removing the threat.

2009]

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

167

of evidence presentation and its verification. The burden of proof shall rest on the state
that is about to use force in self-defense. A high threshold or standard of proof must
be established to prevent abuse of the right of self-defense.131 Currently, there is no
consensual definition of such an evidentiary standard. Scholarly opinions differ from
“clear and convincing”132 to “clear, unambiguous, subject to proof, and not easily open
to misinterpretation or fabrication.”133 Establishing a high standard of proof will not
be an easy task, as most of the terrorist operations are planned and conducted covertly
without much publicity. Also, access to reliable intelligence information will be
difficult. But all these aspects together will serve as an effective deterrent to any abuse
of the right of self-defense.134 If any such abuse occurs, it must be strictly condemned
by the competent international body and the community as a whole, including the
imposition of appropriate and effective sanctions on the transgressor state.
The most recent cases—including the September 11, 2001, attacks, the attacks on
the United States embassies of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, or Hezbollah’s attacks on
Israel in July 2006—seem to indicate that the international community is much more
receptive to claims of self-defense in extreme situations than it has been in the past.135
While some states condemned the United States’ defensive reaction—in particular, its
action against the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant allegedly involved in chemical
weapons production—others were supportive. It must be noted that neither the
General Assembly nor the Security Council condemned the United States’ attacks.
Surprisingly enough, even the League of Arab States remained silent regarding the
attack on Afghanistan; however, it condemned the U.S. attack on the Sudan.136 As a
matter of legal principle, many states supported the Israeli claim of self-defense when
responding to the previous armed attack conducted by Hezbollah fighters. A decade

131. In this respect, Professor Antonio Cassese suggested that it ultimately should be the Security
Council authorizing use of force against states assisting or tolerating terrorists. Cassese, supra note 32, at
1000. He concluded it is up to this representative body “to decide whether, and on what conditions to
authorise the use of force against specific states, on the basis of compelling evidence showing that those
states, instead of stopping the action of terrorist organizations and detaining its members, harbour, protect,
tolerate or promote such organizations, in breach of the general duty.” Id.
132. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 19 (2002).
133. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 142 (2nd ed. 1979).
134. Another issue that deserves attention is the “sensitivity” of the evidence, which is to be presented
to the international forum. It is very likely that the information possessed by the would-be victim state will
be classified or confidential. Its disclosure and presentation to the public might endanger ongoing or future
intelligence operations. It seems that this might be one aspect discouraging the respective state from such
disclosure. On the other hand, one might argue if the intentions of the “victim” state are clear and fair, it
should not be afraid of such disclosure.
135. Professor Franck argues that within the Security Council and the General Assembly, more states
seem to show “greater tolerance for states that carry their wars with terrorists and insurgents across borders
to strike at safe havens.” FRANCK, supra note 50, at 65.
136. Even more support was received in the aerial bombing campaign in Afghanistan following the
September 11, 2001, attacks. Numerous states have either directly or indirectly participated in the aerial
strikes. Several Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Qatar provided either
their airspace or other subsidiary facilities. It must be also mentioned that approximately fifty members of
the Organization for the Islamic Conference demanded the government of the United States not to extend
the defensive military response beyond the territory of Afghanistan, but they were not critical of military
measures taken against Afghanistan. See Daniel Williams, Islamic Group Offers U.S. Mild Rebuke, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 2001, at A21.
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ago, such an international reaction would be highly unusual or even impossible. In
light of the aforementioned, it must be held that terrorist attacks of significant scale and
effect should be considered as armed attacks for the purposes of Article 51. Of course,
the notion of “armed attack” does not reflect the meaning associated thereto in late
1940s; today’s interpretation must inevitably include the most important threats to the
most essential interest of a state—its own security.
It is doubtful to what extent it can be claimed that a new custom of general
international law is being formed in relation to self-defense against attacks of non-state
actors. The acceptance of such custom is far from being universal. It is submitted that
the current apparatus of the law of state responsibility forms a sufficient basis for
attribution. It is obvious that the highly-criticized principle of attribution—the notion
of “effective control” introduced by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua
case—does not reflect the current state of international law. It is incumbent upon the
International Court of Justice to find ways of interpreting the term in the light of
modern developments. Although the court as a whole has made rather confusing
pronouncements on this point, it is undeniable that numerous judges (in particular,
Judges Simma, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal) strongly support a reinterpretation of the
restrictive reading of Article 51. Judge Simma in his separate opinion in the Congo
case spoke to this problem:
[T]he Court could well have afforded to approach the question of the use of armed
force on a large scale by non-state actors in a realistic vein, instead of avoiding it
altogether by a sleight of hand . . . by the unnecessarily cautious way in which it
handles this matter, as well as by dodging the issue of “aggression.” the Court creates
the impression that it somehow feels uncomfortable being confronted with certain
questions of utmost importance in contemporary international relations.137

Regrettably, the court seems to avoid discussing issues essential to the international
community as a whole. In the absence of persuasive and straightforward decisions, it
is the Security Council, invoking semi-judicial functions, that deals with this issue. On
the one hand, the Security Council may expedite the process and approach problems
in a more flexible way; whereas, on the other hand, as Resolution 1373 highlighted, the
council’s pronouncements on the linkage of the right of self-defense with terrorist acts
may be somewhat ambivalent and confusing. The court also had a unique opportunity
to comment on how the Security Council applies the charter law and possibly approve
or disapprove such application. Although the Security Council resolution aimed at a
very specific situation, its universal impact is undeniable.
Another option is the precision and elaboration—or maybe revival—of the
principles of the “state of necessity” in those cases where there is no responsibility or
complicity of the host state. Such a set of rules should not render the use of force
impermissible to combat terrorism if other peaceful means prove inappropriate or
ineffective. As Professor Henkin explained: “It remains necessary to continue to
develop the law of permissible responses to terrorist activities. . . . [I]n my view, it is
not part of the law of self-defense against armed attack contemplated by Article 51.”138

137. Congo, 45 I.L.M. at 371 (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
138. Louis Henkin, Notes From the President: The Missile Attack on Baghdad and Its Justifications,
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. NEWSL., June-Aug. 1993, at 3.
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There is no doubt that the Charter is a living document, which is open to
interpretation. It is flexible enough to incorporate and meet the challenges posed by
today’s world. It is doubtful that a revision of the Charter would be effective. The
process of modifying the Charter is rather complicated and would not be flexible to
adapt to modern challenges. Recently, customary law appears to prevail over the
charter’s text. State practice has in some aspects diverged significantly from the
charter’s textual meaning, particularly in terms of norms regulating the use of force.
It is primarily the evolution of a new customary law that would carefully reflect all of
the significant changes that have occurred over the last two decades.139

139. Professor Rosalyn Higgins also refers to a very interesting point that should be highlighted. In her
opinion, it was the United Nations and its organs and bodies that were afraid to give rise to the wider
doctrine of self-defense, although they had the opportunity to do so. Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Limits
to the Use of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Practive, BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 269, 302 (1961).
Higgins stated in particular “there has merely been a reluctance on the part of the United Nations to
encourage it [the extensive interpretation of Article 51], for fear that it may be too fraught with danger for
the basic policy of peace and stability.” Id. It is a valid point, but the opportunity of the Security Council
due to the continuation of the Cold War was markedly limited. It must not be forgotten that this proposition
was stated almost forty-five years ago. The end of bipolar conflict could have brought change in the
decision-making patterns of the Security Council.

